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Abstract
We model the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision
making over the provision of local public goods. Centralized decisions
are made in a legislature of locally elected representatives, and this
creates a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions.
The legislature can be self-interested or benevolent and this can result
in either efficient, excessive or misallocative provision of public goods.
Decisions are influenced by spillover effects and differences in jurisdic-
tional size. Furthermore, we look at the incentives for centralization.
Key Words: Decentralization; Local public goods.
JEL Numbers: H40, H70, P51.
∗We are grateful to Michael Evers, Ju¨rgen von Hagen, Philipp Jaeschke and Tymofiy
Mylovanov and participants of presentations at the 3rd SFB / TR15 Workshop (Bonn),
the BGSE Micro/Finance/Public-Finance Workshop (Bonn) and the EPCS 2008 Meeting
(Jena). Financial support from the German Research Foundation through SFB / TR15 is
gratefully acknowledged.
†University Bonn
‡University Bonn and IIW. Address: IIW, Lennestr. 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail:
kstaal@uni-bonn.de
1
1 Introduction
Centralization or decentralization of local public good provision is one of the
main questions in the public finance literature. In a country with geograph-
ically distinct districts of different size, local public goods can be provided
and financed by the local governments of districts (decentralization) or pro-
vided and financed by a central government (centralization). The citizens
in a district benefit from the local public goods provided in their district,
but also from a positive spillover effect from the goods provided in the other
districts. This paper studies whether centralization of decision making and
which way of centralized decision making is desirable from a social welfare
perspective and whether citizens actually prefer centralization.
Oates (1972) started with the (now) standard approach that each gov-
ernment maximizes the aggregate surplus of its citizens. Under decentralized
decision making, this maximization is done separately for each district, while
under centralized decision making this is done with a uniform public good
level for each district. On the one hand, with decentralization the spillover
effects are not taken into account and thus, there is underprovision. On
the other hand, however, with centralization the uniform level does not take
the differences between districts into account properly. When there are no
spillover effects, Oates’ Decentralization Theorem says that decentralization
is desirable from a social welfare perspective. When there are spillovers, how-
ever, centralization can be desirable depending on the differences between the
districts and the size of the spillover effect.
Besley and Coate (2003) wrote one of the first papers in which centraliza-
tion does not imply that uniform levels of public goods have to be provided.
They argue that the assumption of uniformity is neither empirically1 nor
theoretically satisfactory, since there is no convincing theoretical reason that
a central government could not provide different levels in districts. There-
fore, they use the citizen-candidate approach2 to model centralization as
decision making in a legislature of locally elected representatives that are
self-interested, arguing that this is typically the case in centralized decision
making.
1Examples they give are federal highway spending in the U.S.A. -see Knight (2002)-
, federal spending on river and harbor projects by the Army Corps of engineers -see
Ferejohn (1974)- and federal spending on parks by the Department of the Interior. In
these examples, federal spending is unequal for each district/state.
2See Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997) and Coate (1997).
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In the legislature, the representatives of each district have to make a
joint decision on the levels of local public goods, given the different prefer-
ences in each district for the levels as well as the allocation of the public
goods. Besley and Coate look at two specifications of centralized decision
making in the legislature. In the first one, a minimum winning coalition3 is
formed in the legislature and representatives in this coalition make the deci-
sion according to their own preferences. This leads to misallocation as well
as uncertainty in public good provision, since more public goods are provided
to the districts whose representatives are in the coalition, while citizens of a
district are unsure whether their representative will be in the minimum win-
ning coalition. In the second specification, there is a cooperative legislature,
in which the representatives maximize their joint surplus. This can lead to
strategic delegation, since citizens of each district may elect representatives
who demand a high level of public goods for their district.
A major contribution of our paper is to model a benevolent legislature
that maximizes the aggregate surplus of its citizens, but that is not restricted
to a uniform level of public goods under centralized decision making. This
is in sharp contrast to Besley and Coate (2003) where the self-interested
legislature does not maximize the aggregate surplus of its citizens, but of its
representatives. The latter implies a departure from the standard approach
by not only dropping the assumption of uniform levels under centralization,
but also changing the objective of the legislature. Our approach, as opposed
to the others, implies that under centralized decision making the socially
optimal levels of public goods are provided.
Another major contribution of our paper is the study of the incentives
citizens have for centralizing decision making. We find that, even though
centralization leads to a bigger aggregate surplus, individuals in one of the
districts might reject centralization since their payoff would decrease, even
though the gain in the other district would outweigh this loss. Furthermore,
we find that in the approach where centralized decision making obtains the
socially optimal levels of public goods, centralization of public good provision
is less likely to take place than under other approaches.
Our paper is thus closely related to Besley and Coate (2003). In their
approach, individuals within as well as across districts have different pref-
erences over public good provision, while in our paper the key difference is
3See Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Riker (1962), Ferejohn, Morris and McKelvey
(1987) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
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district size. A comparison of the results implies that the difference in district
size is only an imperfect proxy for differences in preferences. For example,
when there are only differences across districts, strategic delegation does not
take place. Another related paper is Lockwood (2002), but in his approach
districts are of the same size, and local public good provision is discrete.
Our research also relates to papers that consider the choice between cen-
tralization and decentralization, such as Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003),
Goyal and Staal (2004) and Bolton and Roland (1997). Other papers also en-
dogenize the decision for centralization, such as Bolton, Roland and Spolaore
(1996), Dur and Staal (2008) and Ellingsen (1998), and look at districts of
different size, but only in cases in which the large district dominates decision
making after centralization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we specify
the payoffs. Section 3 presents the socially optimal outcome, while Section
4 presents the outcome under the standard approach. Section 5 discusses
the approach introduced by Besley and Coate (2003) and in Section 6 we
introduce our approach in which a benevolent legislature makes decisions on
public good provision. In Section 7 we conclude with some more general
remarks.
2 The public good
Assume that a country is divided into two geographically distinct districts.
Each district has a continuum of individuals, the districts i ∈ {1, 2} have a
population size N1 and N2, with N1+N2 = 2, and without loss of generality,
we assume that N1 ≤ N2. In each district, an amount gi of the public good
is provided and the payoff an individual in district i gets from these public
goods is given by
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i),
where the parameter κ ∈ [0, 1/2] denotes the spillover effect. The higher κ,
the higher the payoff individuals get from the public goods provided in the
other districts. When κ = 0, individuals do not benefit from the public goods
provided in the other district, while when κ = 1/2, individuals get the same
benefit from a unit of public good provided in the other district.
Each individual is endowed with a single private good x and the produc-
tion of the public goods g1 and g2 requires pg1 and pg2 units of the private
good. In the following, we look at centralized and decentralized decision
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making over the level of public good provision. Under centralized decision
making, the costs of public good provision is borne by the individuals in both
districts, so an individual’s payoff is given by
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i) + x− p(gi + g−i)
2
. (1)
Under decentralized decision making, individuals in each district have to bear
the costs of public good provision in their own district and an individual has
a payoff of
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i) + x− pgi
Ni
. (2)
Finally, in the following we also look at the individual incentives for central-
ization of decision making. There is a referendum in each district and each
individual can choose between centralization or decentralization. Centraliza-
tion only takes place when majorities in both districts prefer centralized over
decentralized decision making.
3 The social optimum
We use the socially optimal outcome as a benchmark for comparing the re-
sults under centralized and decentralized decision making. We furthermore
use social surplus to compare whether centralization of decision making is de-
sirable, from a social welfare point of view. When g1 and g2 are the provided
levels of public goods, the social surplus is given by
[N1(1− κ) +N2κ] ln(g1) + [N1κ+N2(1− κ)] ln(g2)− p(g1 + g2). (3)
The social optimum is given by the public good levels gˆ1 and gˆ2 that maxi-
mizes the aggregate public good surplus:
(gˆ1, gˆ2) = argmaxg1,g2 =
[N1(1− κ) +N2κ] ln(g1) + [N1κ+N2(1− κ)] ln(g2)− p(g1 + g2).
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The public good levels that maximize aggregate public good surplus are
calculated by taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(gˆ1, gˆ2) =
(
N1(1− κ) +N2κ
p
,
N1κ+N2(1− κ)
p
)
. (4)
Note that when N1 exceeds N2, district 1’s level is higher for all κ < 1/2.
4 The standard approach
In the standard approach, following Oates (1972), a government maximizes
the aggregate public good surplus of its citizens. We look consecutively at
decentralized and centralized decision making. Under decentralized decision
making, each district has its own government, while under centralized deci-
sion making a single government represents both districts. The section ends
with a comparison of centralized and decentralized decision making.
Decentralized decision making In a decentralized system each district’s
government chooses independently the district’s local public good level. The
government’s objective is to maximize local public good surplus in its own
district. Note that the chosen public good levels
(
gd1 , g
d
2
)
form a Nash equi-
librium. This implies that these public good levels are given by the following
maximization problem:
gdi = argmax
gi
{
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i)− pgi
Ni
}
. (5)
The public good levels under decentralized decision making are calculated
by taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(
gd1 , g
d
2
)
=
(
(1− κ)N1
p
,
(1− κ)N2
p
)
. (6)
While each government maximizes the surplus of its own citizens, the local
public good levels under non-cooperative decentralized decision making are
only surplus-maximizing when there is no spillover effect. When there is a
spillover effect, there is underprovision of public goods in both districts, and
this underprovision becomes more severe when the spillover effect increases.
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Centralized decision making In a centralized system, a uniform level of
the public good is provided by assumption in each district. The government’s
objective is to maximize the aggregate local public good surplus of the citizens
in both districts. This implies that the amount of public goods is given by
the following maximization problem:
gc1 = g
c
2 = argmax
g
{2 ln(g)− 2pg} . (7)
The public good levels under standard centralized decision making are cal-
culated by taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
gc1 = g
c
2 =
1
p
. (8)
Note that the level of local public goods does not depend on the size of the
spillover effect. It only equals the socially optimal levels when the spillover
effect is perfect (i.e. κ = 1/2) or when both districts have the same size.
When the spillover effect is imperfect, there is overprovision in the small
district but underprovision in the big district.
Comparison We first examine whether centralization of decision making
is desirable from a social welfare perspective. To do so, we subtract the
aggregate surplus under decentralized decision making -(3) with (6)- from
the surplus under centralization -(3) with (8)-.
(Ni(1− κ) +N−iκ) ln ((1− κ)Ni)− (Niκ+N−i(1− κ)) ln ((1− κ)N−i)− 2κ
(9)
Centralization is thus desirable when the above difference is positive.
Note that from the results above it follows that under decentralized de-
cision making the socially optimal levels of local public goods are provided
when there is no spillover effect. When the spillover effect is perfect, how-
ever, socially optimal levels are provided under centralized decision making.
Finally, the underprovision of local public goods under decentralized decision
making increases with the size of the spillover effect, while local public good
levels under centralized decision making do not depend on the size of the
spillover effect. These observations imply the following.
Proposition 1 Under the standard approach, decentralized decision making
leads to a higher local public good surplus when there is no spillover effect.
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There is a value of the spillover effect such that both centralized and decen-
tralized decision making create the same surplus, while with perfect spillovers
centralized decision making leads to a higher surplus.
Note that this proposition is in line with Oates’ Decentralization Theorem
- in the absence of spillovers, decentralized decision making is optimal. An
illustration of the social incentives for centralization is given in Figure 1.
Now look at an individual’s preferences over centralization of decision
making. Subtracting the payoff under decentralization -(2) with (6)- from the
payoff under centralization -(1) with (8)- gives the incentives of an individual
to choose centralization:
−(1− κ) ln((1− κ)Ni)− κ ln((1− κ)N−i)− κ. (10)
The individuals in district i thus prefer centralization over decentralization
if this is positive. When 0 < Ni ≤ 1 then (10) decreases with increasing
Ni for all 0 ≤ κ ≤ 12 and for Ni = 1 it is positive for all possible values of
κ. The individuals in district 1 thus always prefer centralization of decision
making. For 1 < Ni ≤ 2, however, (10) is negative when κ = 0 and positive
for κ = 1
2
. Individuals in district 2 thus only prefer centralization when the
spillover effect is big enough. This implies the following.
Proposition 2 Under the standard approach, centralization only takes place
when the spillover effect exceeds a certain threshold value.
An illustration of these incentives for centralizing decision making is given
in Figure 1.
We now compare the incentives for centralization under majority voting
with the socially optimal incentives. To do so, we compare the pairs of Ni and
κ for which (9) and (10) are positive. To make such a comparison insightful,
we have calculated for a thousand values of N2 the values of κ for which (9)
and (10) are equal to zero. These values can be found in Figure 1, and this
illustrates the following result.
Proposition 3 From a social welfare perspective, individuals have insuffi-
cient incentives to centralize decision making.
There is an obvious explanation for these insufficient incentives. Under decen-
tralized decision making, all individuals within each district obtain the same
payoff, say Sˆ1 and Sˆ2, respectively, and total surplus then is N1Sˆ1 + N2Sˆ2.
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Centralization only takes place if the payoffs for both districts increase. How-
ever, when centralization only makes one payoff higher and the other pay-
off (only a bit) smaller, the latter individuals will reject centralization even
though centralization could increase aggregate social welfare.
We see in Figure 1 that for small values of the spillover effect, centraliza-
tion is neither the majority voting outcome nor socially desirable. From a
social welfare perspective, for small spillover effects it is better to have public
good levels that depend on district size, even though there might be under-
provision in the small district. For higher spillover effects, however, the un-
derprovision becomes so severe that centralization does better, even though
under centralization uniform levels have to be provided in both districts.
Under majority voting, nevertheless, individuals in the largest districts are
even more reluctant to centralization, since under centralized decision mak-
ing they partly have to bear the costs of the public goods provided in the
smaller district.
Some assumptions underlying the standard approach influence the results
significantly. One is that a government chooses public good levels to max-
imize aggregate public good surplus, and another is that under centralized
decision making uniform levels of public goods have to be provided. In Sec-
tion 5, we introduce elections of individuals representing the government,
and these individuals choose public good levels to maximize their own sur-
plus. This alters the first assumption, while we also drop the assumption
of uniformity under centralized decision making. In Section 6, public good
levels also do not need to be uniform under centralized decision making, and
again there are elections of individuals representing the government. These
individuals, however, maximize aggregate public good surplus, thus restoring
the first-mentioned assumption.
5 A self-interested legislature
In this section we introduce elections to the model, using the citizen-can-
didate approach. In this approach, elections are organized to select an in-
dividual for a legislature (government). Elected individuals are assumed to
base their decisions on their own self-interest, and a voter therefore tries to
select a candidate whose self-interest is in line with the voter’s interest. We
first look at decentralized decision making and then at centralized decision
making with a self-interested legislature. The section ends with a comparison
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of both forms of decision making.
Decentralized decision making With decentralized decision making in
self-interested legislatures, individuals in each district elect a single represen-
tative from the district who then determines its policy. First, simultaneous
elections thus make place in each district to determine which individuals (i.e.
citizens) represent a district. Second, the two elected individuals simulta-
neously but separately determine the levels of public goods in each district.
We solve this game by backward induction. The two elected individuals of
district i ∈ {1, 2} face the following maximization problem:
gdi = argmax
gi
{
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i)− pgi
Ni
}
. (11)
The public good levels under decentralized decision making are calculated
by taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(
gd1 , g
d
2
)
=
(
(1− κ)N1
p
,
(1− κ)N2
p
)
. (12)
Note that in a district all citizens have the same preferences. Accordingly,
the levels of public goods do not depend on which citizens are elected, and
the local public good levels
(
gd1 , g
d
2
)
are thus given by expression (12). Fur-
thermore, it follows that decentralized decision making with self-interested
legislatures yields the same outcome as in the standard approach.
Centralized decision making With centralized decision making in a self-
interested legislature, individuals in each district elect a single representative
in a legislature, while the representatives in the legislature make decisions
on the levels of public goods in each district. First, simultaneous elections
thus take place in each district to determine which individuals (i.e. citizens)
represent the district in the legislature. Each district is thus represented by
one individual from the district. Second, the legislature determines the levels
of the public goods. We solve this game by backward induction.
For this solution it is important how the levels of public goods are de-
termined in the legislature. We use the minimum winning coalition view
to model a noncooperative decision process in the legislature, while we also
look at a cooperative decision process in which the representatives in the
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legislature maximize their joint surplus.
Under the minimum winning coalition view, a coalition that forms a ma-
jority of the representatives determines public good levels. When N1 < N2,
one could argue that the representative of district 2 invariably forms the win-
ning coalition in the legislature. The decisions of the legislature would then
only reflect the preferences of district 2’s representative. The level of public
goods provided in district 2 is optimal for the citizens of district 2, while the
level of public goods in district 1 is only determined by the spillover effect
for the individuals in district 2.
However, we do not only evaluate the outcomes in which the represen-
tative of district 2 forms the minimum winning with certainty, but also the
possibility that the representative of each district forms the winning coalition
with a probability proportional to his district’s population size as well as the
possibility that both representatives are in the minimum winning coalition
with equal probability.
Finally, we also look at cooperative decision making in the legislature. In
this case, the representatives in the legislature choose a utilitarian bargaining
solution, maximizing joint surplus.
In a noncooperative legislature and when the representative from district i
forms the minimum winning coalition, this representative faces the following
maximization problem:
(
gci , g
c
−i
)
= arg max
(gi,g−i)
{
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i)− p(gi + g−i)
2
}
. (13)
The public good levels under decentralized decision making are calculated
by taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(
gci , g
c
−i
)
=
(
2(1− κ)
p
,
2κ
p
)
. (14)
Note that in a district all citizens have the same preferences. Accordingly,
the levels of public goods do not depend on which citizens are elected, and
the local public good levels are thus given by expression (14).
For an evaluation of the outcomes, however, it is important which individ-
ual forms the minimum winning coalition. The district whose representative
is in the minimum winning coalition has an advantage in the sense that more
public goods are provided in this district, while less public goods are provided
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in the other district. Except when spillovers are perfect, there thus is misallo-
cation in public good provision. More public goods than the socially optimal
amount are provided in the district whose representative forms the minimum
winning coalition, while less public goods than optimal are provided in the
other district.
Unless the biggest district dominates decision making, such that its rep-
resentative always forms the minimum winning coalition, there is also uncer-
tainty in public good provision. Since it is not clear beforehand whether a
representative is in the minimum winning coalition, it is also unclear where
the highest level of the public good is provided.
Finally, note that the public good levels are only equal to the socially
optimal levels when the spillover effect is perfect.
In a cooperative legislature, both representatives face the following maxi-
mization problem for the joint surplus.
(gc1, g
c
2) = arg max
(g1,g2)
∑
i∈{1,2}
{
(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i)− p(gi + g−i)
2
}
. (15)
The public good levels chosen by a cooperative legislature are calculated by
taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(gc1, g
c
2) =
(
1
p
,
1
p
)
. (16)
Note that in a district all citizens have the same preferences. Accordingly,
the levels of public goods do not depend on which citizens are elected, and
the local public good levels are thus given by expression (16). Furthermore,
it follows that centralized decision making with self-interested legislatures
yields the same outcome as in the standard approach.
Comparison Several comparisons can be made. We first compare decen-
tralization with noncooperative as well as cooperative centralization and then
cooperative with noncooperative centralization. Furthermore, we look at the
incentives individuals have for centralization.
As in the standard approach, under decentralized decision making each
government maximizes the surplus of its own citizens and the local public
good levels are only surplus-maximizing when there is no spillover effect.
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When there is a spillover effect, there is underprovision of public goods
in both districts, and this underprovision becomes more severe when the
spillover effect increases. With noncooperative as well as cooperative cen-
tralized decision making, the public good levels are only socially optimal
when the spillover effect is perfect. These observations are reflected in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 With self-interested legislatures, for noncooperative as well
as cooperative centralization, it holds that decentralized decision making leads
to a higher public good surplus when there is no spillover effect. There is a
value of the spillover effect such that both centralized and decentralized deci-
sion making create the same surplus, while with perfect spillovers centralized
decision making leads to a higher surplus.
Note that this comparison is qualitatively the same as the comparison made
for the standard approach and that it is thus also in line with Oates’ De-
centralization Theorem - in the absence of spillovers, decentralized decision
making is optimal. The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix.
With self-interested legislatures, the public good levels with decentralized
as well as with cooperative centralized decision making are the same as the
levels under the standard approach. The comparison of decentralized and
cooperative centralized decision making is thus analogous to the comparison
presented in Section 4. From the discussion in this section it also follows
that under cooperative as well as noncooperative centralized decision making
individuals have fewer incentives for centralization than socially desirable.
Now we turn to individual incentives for noncooperative centralization.
These incentives depend on the expected public good surplus under central-
ization and thus depend on which representative forms the minimum winning
coalition under centralization. Let Pr[i] denote the probability that the rep-
resentative of district i forms the minimum winning coalition. Then the ex-
pected public good surplus of an individual in district i under centralization
is
Pr[i] {(1− κ) ln (gi) + κ ln (g−i)}+ Pr[−i] {(1− κ) ln (g−i) + κ ln (gi)} − 1
(17)
with (gi, g−i) given by (14). The public good surplus of an individual in
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district i under decentralized decision making is
(1− κ) ln
(
(1− κ)Ni
p
)
+ κ ln
(
(1− κ)N−i
p
)
− (1− κ) (18)
and an individual prefers centralization when (17) is larger than (18). The
individual incentives for cooperative centralization are given by subtract-
ing the payoff under decentralization -(2) with (12)- from the payoff under
centralization -(1) with (16)-. The following result is based on the above
differences.
Proposition 5 With a self-interested legislature, individuals only choose to
centralize (cooperative or noncooperative) decision making when the spillover
effect exceeds a certain threshold value.
The proof of Proposition 5 is in the appendix.
We now take a look at the individual incentives for noncooperative cen-
tralization. For such a comparison we should compare the pairs of Ni and κ
for which the social surplus and the difference of (17) and (18) are positive for
the three different approaches to forming a minimum winning coalition. To
make this insightful we have calculated the values of κ for a thousand values
of N2, for which the social surplus and these differences are equal to zero.
These values can be found in Figure 2. It follows that when the districts do
not differ much in size -when N2 is close to 1- the incentives for centralization
do not differ much when the minimum winning coalition is formed by the
larger district either with probability 1
2
or with a probability equal to N2
2
.
Clearly, this is due to the fact that the latter two probabilities are almost the
same. When the larger district forms the minimum winning coalition with
probability 1, however, individuals in the smaller district are less likely to
prefer centralization and centralization only occurs for larger values of the
spillover effect.
When there is a bigger difference in size between both districts, central-
ization is most likely to take place when the larger district is in the minimum
winning coalition with probability 1. In this case, the individuals always
prefer centralization since they dominate centralized decision making and
are thus able to set public good levels to their own preferences. Moreover,
the small district is so small that its individuals benefit from centralization in
most cases, even though decisions are then made according to the preferences
of individuals in the big district. When both districts are in the minimum
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winning coalition with equal probability, the individuals in the small district
prefer centralization in more cases. The individuals in the large district,
however, are less likely to prefer centralization since it makes it possible that
public good levels are set according to the preferences of the individuals in
the small district.
In the approach that we discus in this section, representatives in the leg-
islature choose public good levels that maximize their own payoff. In the
standard approach, however, public good levels are chosen to maximize the
aggregate surplus of all the individuals. In the next section, we therefore
change the objective of the legislature. Instead of self-interest, we then as-
sume that representatives in the legislature are benevolent in the sense that
they choose to maximize an aggregate surplus, as is assumed in the standard
approach.
6 A benevolent legislature
In Section 5 we introduced elections in the decision making over the levels of
public goods. Public good provision was no longer uniform across districts, as
it is in the standard approach, and at the same time, the benevolent surplus-
maximizing legislature was changed into representatives making decisions
based on self-interest. In this section we introduce a new approach of decision
making, in which, as in the approach with a self-interested legislature, public
good provision need not be uniform across districts, but the legislature is
assumed to be benevolent, that is to maximize surplus. We first look at
decentralized decision making and then at centralized decision making in
this benevolent-legislature approach. The section ends with a comparison of
both forms of decision making.
Decentralized decision making Under the benevolent-legislature ap-
proach and with decentralized decision making, individuals in each district
elect a single representative from the district who then determines its policy.
First, simultaneous elections thus take place in each district to determine
which individuals (i.e. citizen) represent a district. Second, the two elected
individuals simultaneously but separately determine the levels of public goods
in each district. These levels maximize the aggregate surplus in each district.
We solve this game by backward induction. The two elected individuals of
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district i ∈ {1, 2} face the following maximization problem:
gdi = argmax
gi
{Ni [(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i)]− pgi} . (19)
The public good levels under decentralized decision making are calculated
by taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(
gd1 , g
d
2
)
=
(
(1− κ)N1
p
,
(1− κ)N2
p
)
. (20)
Since in a district all citizens have the same preferences, the levels of public
goods do not depend on which citizens are elected, and the local public good
levels are thus indeed given by expression (20). A comparison of expressions
(6), (12) and (20) reveals that, under decentralized decision making, the
outcomes with a benevolent legislature are the same as with a self-interested
legislature and in the standard approach.
Centralized decision making Under the benevolent-legislature approach
and with centralized decision making, individuals in each district elect a sin-
gle representative in a legislature, while the representatives in the legislature
make decisions on the levels of public goods in each district. First, simul-
taneous elections take place in each district to determine which individuals
(i.e. citizens) represent the district in the legislature. Second, the legisla-
ture determines the levels of the public goods. The representatives in the
legislature choose these levels such that the levels maximize the aggregate
surplus of both districts, given the preferences revealed in the first stage. We
solve this game by backward induction. The representatives thus face the
following maximization problem:
(
gci , g
c
−i
)
= arg max
(gi,g−i)
∑
i∈{1,2}
{
Ni [(1− κ) ln(gi) + κ ln(g−i)]−Nip(gi + g−i)
2
}
(21)
The public good levels under centralized decision making are calculated by
taking first-order conditions and solving. This yields:
(gc1, g
c
2) =
(
N1(1− κ) +N2κ
p
,
N1κ+N2(1− κ)
p
)
. (22)
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Note that in a district all citizens have the same preferences. Accordingly,
the levels of public goods do not depend on which citizens are elected, and
the local public good levels are thus given by expression (22). A comparison
of (4) and (22) reveals that centralized decision making by a benevolent
legislature leads to the socially optimal levels of public goods.
Comparison From the results above it follows that under centralized de-
cision making, the socially optimal levels are always provided. Under decen-
tralization, the optimal levels are only provided when there is no spillover
effect. These observations imply the following proposition.
Proposition 6 With a benevolent legislature, centralized and decentralized
decision making leads to the same surplus when there is no spillover effect,
while centralized decision making leads to a higher public good surplus when
there is a spillover effect.
Again, this is similar to the results obtained for the standard approach and
with a benevolent legislature, but in an even more clear-cut way. In the ab-
sence of spillover effects, decentralization is optimal -Oates’ Decentralization
Theorem- while with a benevolent legislature, in all other cases centralized
decision making is strictly better.
Now look at the individual preferences over centralization of decision
making. Subtracting the payoff under decentralization -(2) with (20)- from
the payoff under centralization -(1) with (22)- gives the incentives of an
individual for centralization
(1− κ) ln((1− κ)Ni + κN−i) + κ ln((1− κ)N−i + κNi)−
(1− κ) ln((1− κ)Ni)− κ ln((1− κ)N−i)− κ. (23)
The individuals in district i thus prefer centralization over decentralization
if this is positive. It is straightforward to show that this difference is positive
when both districts have the same size and that district 1, the smaller district,
always prefers centralization. For individuals in district 2, the larger district,
the difference is always positive when the spillover effect is perfect, that is
when κ = 1
2
. It is straightforward to show, however, that centralization does
not always take place under majority voting when κ < 1
2
.
Now compare the individual incentives for centralization under the stan-
dard approach with those with a self-interested or a benevolent government.
To do so, we have calculated the threshold values of κ for a thousand values
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of N2, above which centralization takes place under majority voting. This is
done for the standard approach, giving the same outcome as with cooperative
centralization in a self-interested legislature. For noncooperative centraliza-
tion with a self-interested legislature, we took the minimum value of κ above
which centralization takes place. That is, for N2 close to 1 we took the κs
when each district is in the minimum winning coalition with a probability
proportional to district size, while for bigger values of N2 we took the the κs
when the representative from the larger district always forms the minimum
winning coalition.
Figure 3 illustrates that when the difference in size between the two dis-
tricts is small, centralization is most likely the majority voting outcome under
the standard approach. When the difference in district size is large, however,
centralization is more likely to be the majority voting outcome under nonco-
operative centralization with a self-interested legislature. From this it follows
that, even though centralization with a benevolent legislature would imply
socially optimal levels of public goods, it also implies smaller incentives for
centralization.
7 Concluding remarks
Public economists have extensively researched the centralized versus decen-
tralized provision of local public goods. In the standard approach of Oates
(1972), albeit assuming that benevolent governments maximize aggregate
welfare of their citizens, centralized provision implies uniform levels of public
goods. This uniformity is a disadvantage of centralization since it prevents
differences between districts to be reflected in the levels of public goods that
are provided.
In the approach of Besley and Coate (2003), citizens choose represen-
tatives in legislatures that make decisions on public good provision. The
representatives maximize their own surplus, instead of maximizing the ag-
gregate surplus of the citizens. Additionally, the representatives can provide
different levels to each district under centralized decision making. This, how-
ever, leads to misallocation and uncertainty in public good provision, since
centralized decisions are assumed to be made by a minimum winning coali-
tion of representatives in the legislature. The citizens are uncertain whether
their representatives will be in this coalition, while the representatives in
the coalition make decisions based on their own preferences, ignoring the
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preferences in the other districts.
The approach we propose in this paper deviates in just a single way from
the standard approach. Centralized decision making is done by a benev-
olent legislature that maximizes the aggregate surplus, as in the standard
approach, but can provide different public good levels in each district. In
contrast to Besley and Coate (2003), socially optimal public good provision
takes place under centralization. However, centralization is not always pre-
ferred by a majority of the individuals.
The analysis can be extended in several important ways. One way is to
loosen the uniform taxation assumption. Another way is introducing trans-
fers into the analysis. Finally, since district size is observable, the analysis
opens possibilities for empirical research on, for example, the preferences
of districts over centralization, given the different ways the decision-making
process is structured after centralization.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that when there is no spillover effect
the public good surplus attains the maximum possible value under decentral-
ization, since the public good levels are then socially optimal. This proves
the first statement in the proposition. Likewise, when the spillover effect is
perfect, with noncooperative as well as cooperative decision making the pub-
lic good surplus attains the maximum possible value under centralization.
This proves the last statement in the proposition.
The aggregate public goods surplus under decentralization is
(N1(1− κ) +N2κ) ln
(
(1−κ)N1
p
)
+ (N1κ+N2(1− κ)) ln
(
(1−κ)N2
p
)
−2(1− κ).
The aggregate public good surplus under noncooperative centralization de-
pends on which representative forms the minimum winning coalition. Let
Pr[i] denote the probability that the representative of district i forms the
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minimum winning coalition. The expected value of the surplus then is
Pr[1]
[
(N1(1− κ) +N2κ) ln
(
2(1−κ)
p
)
+ (N1κ+N2(1− κ)) ln
(
2κ
p
)]
+
Pr[2]
[
(N1(1− κ) +N2κ) ln
(
2κ
p
)
(N1κ+N2(1− κ)) ln
(
2(1−κ)
p
)]
−2.
and the aggregate public good surplus under cooperative centralization is
2 ln
(
1
p
)
− 2.
Note that the three public good surpluses are continuous in κ. Together
with the two statements mentioned at the beginning of the proof it follows
that there exists a value of κ such that centralized and decentralized decision
making create the same surplus.
Proof of Proposition 5.
When the minimum winning coalition is formed by the larger district,
then the expected gain from centralizing decision making for an individual
in district 1 is
−(1− κ) ln
(
(1− κ)N1
2κ
)
− κ ln
(
N2
2
)
− κ
while the expected gain for an individual in district 2 is
−(1− κ) ln
(
N2
2
)
− κ ln
(
(1− κ)N1
2κ
)
− κ.
It is straightforward to show that the expected gain for an individual in
district 2 is always positive. When κ = 0, the difference for individuals in
district 1 is negative, and when κ = 1/2, the gain is positive. Since individu-
als in both districts have to choose to centralize, it follows that centralization
only takes place when κ exceeds a threshold value.
When the minimum winning coalition is formed by each district with
a probability proportional to district size, that is, with probability N1/2
for district 1 and probability N2/2 for district 2, the expected gain from
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centralization is
−(1− κ) ln ((1− κ)Ni) + κ ln ((1− κ)N−i)+
Ni
2
((1− κ) ln(2κ) + κ ln(2− 2κ))
+N−i
2
((1− κ) ln(2− 2κ) + κ ln(2κ))− κ.
It is straightforward to show that this gain is always positive for κ = 1/2.
When κ is close enough to 0, however, this difference is negative, while the
gain is increasing in κ. It thus follows that centralization only takes place
when κ exceeds a threshold value.
When the minimum winning coalition is formed by each district with
equal probability, the expected gain from centralization for an individual in
district 1 is
−(1− κ) ln ((1− κ)N1)− κ ln ((1− κ)N2) + 1
2
ln (4κ(1− κ))− κ
while the expected gain from decentralization for an individual in district 2
is
−(1− κ) ln ((1− κ)N2)− κ ln ((1− κ)N1) + 1
2
ln (4κ(1− κ))− κ.
For κ = 1
2
, the expected gain from centralization is always positive for the
individuals in district 1, and this gain is increasing in κ. For κ = 0, the
difference for individuals in district 2 is negative and for κ = 1
2
, the gain
is positive, while the difference is increasing in κ. Since individuals in both
districts have to prefer centralization to let centralization take place, it follows
that centralization only happens when κ exceeds a threshold value.
With a cooperative legislature, the analysis is the same as in the standard
approach.
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no centralization
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and majority voting outcome
size district 2
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Figure 1: Individual and social incentives under the standard approach.
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size district 2
no centralization
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3
Minimum winning coalition: 
1) probability ½; 2) probability proportional to district size; 3) the largest district.
Figure 2: Individual incentives with a self-interested legislature (noncooper-
ative).
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Figure 3: Comparison of individual incentives.
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